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In this
significant termination of parental rights appeal, not only did
the Supreme Court re-instate the trial court's decision to terminate
the respondent mother's parental rights, the Court took the unusual
step of vacating the opinion of the appellate court, which held
1) that the state failed to demonstrate that the mother could not
benefit from reunification services, and 2) that the state could
not show that the mother was unwilling or unable to benefit from
reunification services unless it had already provided her reasonable
assistive efforts.
The Supreme
Court concluded that the first issue was moot on appeal and therefore
the appellate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review
the claim, and that the court's analysis of the reasonable efforts
requirement was contrary to the express language of Conn. Gen. Stat.
17a-112(j). This case began after infant Jorden suffered severe
and inexplicable injuries while in the care of his parents. DCF
moved to terminate parental rights shortly after the child's initial
removal on the ground that the child was harmed as a result of the
parents' acts of "commission or omission." At trial, DCF successfully
alleged that the parents were unable to benefit from services, thus
relieving the department of its obligation to provide rehabilitation
and reunification services.
The Appellate
Court affirmed the "omission/commission" ground for termination,
reasoning that because the child suffered injuries in the care of
his parents for which no adequate explanation was offered, there
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion.
However, the Appellate Court held that the trial court erroneously
found that the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification
services. The appellate court noted that the trial court found the
respondent "facially complied" with the specific steps ordered for
her. Additionally, although there was evidence that the mother briefly
renewed her relationship with the physically abusive father, the
record also demonstrated that the mother quickly terminated that
relationship, continued with appropriate counseling and sought a
restraining order against the father. The appellate court determined
that the trial court's factual finding that the mother could not
or would not benefit from these services was clearly erroneous given
ample evidence in the record of the mother's efforts and progress
with services and visitation.
The Supreme
Court first noted that the termination statute requires the state
to demonstrate that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify a
family, unless in the same proceeding, the court finds that the
parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Therefore, to the extent that the appellate court ruling could be
construed as requiring the state to make a predicate showing that
reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family prior to a court's
determination that such efforts were unnecessary, that ruling was
reversed.
Additionally,
the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's holding that the
trial court erroneously found that the mother was unable or unwilling
to benefit from reunification services. The Court noted that though
the trial court found a) that the state hade made reasonable efforts
and b) that the mother was unable and unwilling to benefit from
such efforts, the mother only appealed the second finding. As either
finding is sufficient to support a termination decision, the failure
to appeal both findings rendered the solitary claim moot. Accordingly,
the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to decide the claim
and the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the decision. In so
vacating, the Supreme Court opined that there was ample evidence
in the trial court record to support the court's factual findings
in this regard.
Finally,
on a separate issue, the Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to preclude testimony from the
respondent's independent evaluator where the independent evaluator
had viewed the confidential court evaluation without the respondent
having notified the parties or sought permission to disclose the
report from the court. Such improper disclosure was a violation
of law, as well as a violation of the father's privacy rights. The
trial court was within its discretion to order preclusion as a remedy
for the violation.
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