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JURISDICTION
OF JUVENILE COURT/AUTHORITY TO ISSUE POST-MAJORITY ORDERS
The Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed two discrete
topics in this case: (1) whether the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction
over youths who have turned eighteen, and (2) whether § 17a-11 or
§ 46b-129 provide statutory jurisdiction for youths eighteen and
older to bring cases in front of the Juvenile Court. The Court found
that (1) turning eighteen was not a per se jurisdictional bar to
the Juvenile Court, since it is a subdivision of the Superior Court
and is therefore a court of general jurisdiction, and (2) Section
46b-129(j) provides a statutory basis for youths eighteen and older
to bring claims in front of the Juvenile Court, so long as the factual
jurisdictional predicates in the statute have been met.
After Matthew was adopted, he began exhibiting signs
of serious mental health issues. His parents appealed to DCF for
advice, help, and commitment; however, DCF declined to commit Matthew.
When he was seventeen Matthew set fire to his parents' dwelling
twice, after which he was arrested and placed in a youth institution.
A month before Matthew turned eighteen, he petitioned
the Juvenile Court to adjudicate him uncared for and commit him
into DCF care. The Juvenile Court did so, and ordered DCF to work
with DMHAS to transfer Matthew into the adult agency's care. Matthew
filled a petition to keep DCF from transferring him to DMHAS care
as DMHAS could not provide him with the placement that he needed.
He claimed that DCF was obligated to provide him services pursuant
to an agreement DCF has with DMHAS that DCF will continue to provide
care for youth committed to its care prior to their eighteenth birthday
if they are in school or a training program.
The Juvenile Court ordered that DCF monitor and support
Matthew while he was in treatment, and after completing the treatment,
DCF had to continue to provide necessary services to Matthew. Matthew
was to remain committed to DCF care until he turned twenty-one or
voluntarily decided to leave and the DCF was to pay for all services
Matthew received while he was in DCF care, citing §§ 17a-11 (g)
as support.
DCF appealed this order arguing that the Juvenile
Court loses jurisdiction when a youth turns eighteen and neither
§ 17a-11 nor § 46b-129 provide the court with statutory jurisdiction
to issue post-majority orders binding DCF to provide services.
Regarding the threshold jurisdictional question, the
Supreme Court chose to follow the decision by the Appellate Court
in In re Shonna K., which held that the Juvenile Court is a division
of the Superior Court, and, therefore, is a court of general jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Juvenile Court does not automatically lose jurisdiction
over a party simply because of the party's age.
The Court then turned to the question of whether or
not there was a statutory basis under § 17a-11 or § 46b-129 for
the juvenile court to actually exercise jurisdiction. The Court
held that § 17a-11 does not provide the juvenile court with a basis
to exercise jurisdiction over an eighteen year old's claim for support
or services, because § 17a-11 addresses voluntary services and provides
that such services are offered at DCF's discretion. However, the
Court held that § 46b-129(j), which provides that DCF shall remain
the guardian for committed youth up until age 21 provided the youth
is engaged in a vocational or educational program, gives the juvenile
court continuing jurisdiction to order DCF to serve a qualified
youth. The Court rejected DCF's argument that the language of §
46b-129(j) was merely a grant of authority to DCF to provide services
and did not confer jurisdiction on the juvenile court to compel
the Department to provide such services. The Court also rejected
DCF's argument that a youth who turned 18 who have to exhaust his
or her administrative remedies prior to seeking an order for relief
from the juvenile court.
In Matthew's particular case, the Court found, however,
that the record had not been established at the trial level that
Matthew was engaged at age 18 in a post-secondary education or vocational
program, and therefore the factual predicate required for the juvenile
court's jurisdiction had not been met.
--EM/SHE
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