| |
Termination
of Parental Rights/Failure to Rehabilitate/Best Interests.
In this
termination of parental rights case, the appellate court denied
the mother's claim that the trial court improperly concluded that
she failed to rehabilitate, that the department has failed to make
reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children and that termination
served the best interests of her children.
The mother,
afflicted with substance dependency and mental illness, claimed
that the court erroneously concluded that she failed to rehabilitate
in light of the fact that she complied with substance abuse treatment
in 2004 and 2005, enrolled the children in therapy and was willing
to work with intensive reunification service programs. The appellate
court noted the ample evidence in the record that the mother did
not sustain her rehabilitative efforts, and that she continued to
lack employment, income, and housing. She refused anger management
services, and continued a pattern of arrest and incarceration.
Additionally,
the court appointed evaluator opined that she "was a poor prospect
for rehabilitation." The appellate court reiterated its previous
holding that even substantial compliance with rehabilitative programs
will not prevent a court from terminating parental rights. See In
re Coby C., 107 Conn. App. 395 (2008). Additionally, the mother
claimed that the department failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunify her as required by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j) because the department
did not provide the mother with mental health diagnosis, treatment
goals or specific therapeutic recommendations. The court rejected
the mother's argument, emphasizing that the state is not required
to make all efforts, but only reasonable efforts to reunify a family.
The court pointed to the department's reunification efforts, implementation
of reunification support services and the mother's incarceration
during this period, as evidence that the department's efforts regarding
reunification were reasonable.
Finally,
the appellate court rejected the mother's argument that termination
was not in the best interests of her children. The appellate court
observed that the mother's son Trevon "harbored hopes of reunification"
but concluded that it was proper for the trial court to credit the
testimony of the court appointed evaluator that Trevon was bonded
to his foster father and did not have a strong bond with his mother.
The evaluator also determined that while another child would experience
a significant hardship if she were not to see the mother at all,
this hardship could be overcome in time. Additionally, the social
workers testified at trial that the foster parents for all three
children were willing to adopt. The appellate court emphasized the
long held principle that even the existence of emotional ties between
a parent and her children will not necessarily prevent termination
of parental rights. The appellate court concluded that evidence
was sufficient to support the trial court's best interests conclusion
and that the court made the appropriate requisite findings as required
by C.G.S. § 17a-112.
Sarah
Healy Eagan, Esq.
Director, Child Abuse Project
Center for Children's Advocacy
University of Connecticut School of Law
65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
Tel. 860.570.5327
Fax. 860.570.5256
|
