Case:
Winkelman v. Parma City School District
U.S. Supreme Court (No. 05-983)
Special Education
US Supreme Court
Decided: May 21, 2007
In a surprising reversal
of a 6th Circuit decision, the United States' Supreme Court held
that parents may bring a pro se court action regarding any procedural
or substantive claim arising under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA.) The Court rejected the view of some circuit
courts that, under the statute, parents are "guardians" of their
children's right to an appropriate education, rather than "real
parties in interest" themselves.
In this case, the parents
of an autistic child claimed that the school district denied their
child a free and appropriate public education and sought reimbursement
for private school expenses. After losing their administrative complaints,
the parents, without the assistance of a lawyer, sought review in
the federal district court. The court dismissed their claims on
the pleadings. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court also dismissed
the parents' case, holding that parents may not bring suits on their
own or their children's behalf without the assistance of counsel.
Such suits violated the long-standing common law rule that parents
may not legally represent the interests of their minor children.
The Supreme Court disagreed
with the Circuit Court. Looking to the language and legislative
framework of the statute, the Court noted that multiple provisions
of IDEA indicate that parents are the co-owners of their child's
right to an appropriate education. The Court paid special attention
to the sections of IDEA which provide that the parent may recover
the costs of a private school education and, the court may award
attorneys fees to a prevailing party "who is the parent of a child
with a disability." 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (emphasis
added.) These provisions clearly endow the parents with substantive
rights, for which the parents may seek redress in the courts.
Furthermore, the Court held
that it would be inconsistent to interpret the statute as providing
parents the right to pursue administrative remedies but not court
remedies. The Court cited as examples section 1415(b)(8) (requiring
a state educational agency to develop a model form to assist parents
in filing a complaint); §1415(c)(2) (addressing the response an
agency must provide to a parent's due process complaint notice);
and §1415(i)(3)(B)(i);(referring to the parent's complaint).
Additionally, the Court noted
that IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking "to ensure that
the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children
are protected." §1400(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added.)
The Court also rejected the
argument of certain circuit courts that parents may have standing
to litigate only particular claims, such as procedural violations
or reimbursement requests. The Court reasoned that the statute keeps
parent in a central role, requiring schools to include parents in
the substantive creation of the IEP and permitting parents to bring
any due process claim related to the education of their child. The
Court stated that "[w]ithout question a parent of a child with a
disability has a particular and personal interest in fulfilling
our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals
with disabilities."
The Court concluded that
the provisions of IDEA, through both text and structure, create
in parents an "independent stake not only in the procedures and
costs implicated by this process but also in the substantive decisions
to be made."
Finally, the Court rejected
the school district's argument that the statute does not adequate
put states on notice of additional costs they may incur as a result
of parents' pro-se litigation of educational claims. The school
district cited Supreme Court precedent holding that pursuant to
the Spending Clause, "when Congress attaches conditions to a State's
acceptance of federal funds,. . . the conditions must be set out
unambiguously." Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy,
548 U. S. ___ (2006). The Court dismissed this argument, holding
that the determination that IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable
rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on
states that they would not otherwise be required by law to observe.
The ancillary effect of potentially increasing states' litigation
costs (defending suits brought by parents alone) did not qualify
as a "spending clause" concern.
