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In this case, the parents of Brendan C., an eight
year old with special needs, challenged the termination of their
parental rights by the court. The crux of the father’s claim was
that his parental rights had been improperly terminated solely because
of his mental deficiencies, rather than his inability to parent.
The court record stated that the father’s parental rights were terminated
based on his history of aggressive behavior, problems in his marriage,
problems in his son’s behavior that seemed to be exacerbated by
his relationship with the father, and what the court described as
the father’s inability to recognize or to meet his child’s needs.
The father appealed this decision. In doing so, he suggested that
the Department of Children and Families (DCF) should have provided
him with special assistance and accommodations because of this mental
condition. The father’s claims ultimately failed because he was
not able to demonstrate sufficient evidence of mental incapacity
warranting such special accommodations.
In the appeal, both parents contended that the court
should have appointed a Guardian ad Litem (GAL) to advocate to advocate
on the child’s behalf for reunification with the parents, which
they felt was in their son’s best interest. The parents were not
successful in convincing the court that reunification truly was
in the best interest of this child and they lacked sufficient evidence
that the child actually wanted to live with them, therefore the
court did not see a compelling reason to appoint a GAL for the child.
Additionally, since the court found clear and convincing evidence
that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of
the child, the appointment of a GAL whose role it is to advocate
for what is in the best interest of the child, would not have affected
the outcome of the case. The child’s father also contended that
due to his diminished mental capacity, the court should have appointed
a GAL to advocate on his behalf and that not doing so was in violation
of his due process rights. However, the father did not meet his
burden of demonstrating a level of incapacitation that would warrant
special accommodations such as appointment of a GAL.
In addition, the father claimed that the DCF failed
to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. DCF’s reunification
efforts included referral to a family reunification center where
the parents received couples counseling, individual counseling sessions
and parenting classes. A series of supervised visits between the
child and his parents were also conducted while the child remained
in the custody of foster parents. The court determined that these
efforts by DCF met applicable requirements under the termination
statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112), and emphasized that the standard
is "reasonable" efforts, rather than every possible effort. The
father also contended that DCF failed to make reasonable accommodations
pursuant to the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) in the provision
of reunification services. It is unclear whether this claim would
have been successful even if the father was able to demonstrate
that he had a disability that qualified under the ADA. Based on
precedent, the court, not having recognized any special obligation
created by the ADA for termination proceedings, would still be likely
to apply the reasonable efforts test in accordance with the state’s
termination statutes.
The court also rejected the father’s contention that
his constitutional substantive due process and equal protection
rights had been violated because they were not properly raised at
trial, nor was it clear that such violations clearly existed depriving
him of a fair trial. Thus, the decision to terminate parental rights
in this case was upheld.
This case may be accessed by going to the state Judicial
Branch website at www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP89/89AP313.pdf
Sarah Peterson, Legal Intern.
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