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In In
re Davonta V., the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's
decision to terminate a mother's parental rights on the grounds
that the mother failed to achieve a reasonable degree of rehabilitation
and termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest.
The mother, who suffered from a history of incarceration, mental
illness and drug addiction, did not contest the court's adjudicatory
findings, but rather she argued that the trial court erroneously
found that termination was in the best interests of her child. She
reasoned that the court did not afford adequate weight to the child's
ongoing ties to his biological family and there was no adoption
plan in place for the child, then fourteen years old.
The Appellate
Court rejected the mother's contention that the trial court must
weigh the child's ties to his biological family more heavily than
other factors that relate to the best interest analysis, namely
permanency and closure. The trial court, relying on testimony from
an expert psychologist, a foster care coordinator and a DCF program
supervisor, determined that termination of parental rights was in
the child's best interest because the mother had not stabilized
her life, the child's mental condition had improved while living
in foster care, the child had increasing emotional ties to his foster
family, and the child would benefit from being freed from "legal
limbo."
The Appellate
Court reasoned that it was not the province of the reviewing court
to determine whether it would have weighed the best interest factors
in the exact manner that the trial court did. So long as the trial
court could reasonably have reached its findings based on the evidence,
the reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment.
The Appellate
Court also determined that it was not error for the trial court
to reject the opinion of the Guardian ad Litem in favor of the opinions
of other witnesses. Nor was it error for the court to determine
that termination was in the best interests of the child despite
the fact that the foster parents were not committed to adoption.
The trial court could reasonably have concluded that the more important
factor was that the child was freed for adoption.
In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Schaller contended that the trial court
did not find by clear and convincing evidence that termination was
in the child's best interest. The dissent goes on to reason that
the termination petition punished the parent and child and that
termination could not possibly be in the child's best interest if
it left him without a permanent relationship with anyone. The dissent
noted that the child had "everything to lose and nothing to gain"
by a termination of the respondent's rights. The foster home would
certainly not evict him, his relationship with his mother could
still evolve over time and he adamantly wanted to maintain relationships
with his siblings and other maternal relatives. The dissent reasoned
that the child was not "liberated" by the termination proceeding
and that the "concepts of 'closure' and 'move on' [had] little relevance
to [his future]."
This
case may be accessed by going to the Judicial Branch website at
www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP98/98AP487.pdf
By Sarah
Healy Eagan (10/06).
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