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The Supreme
Court granted certification for appeal in this case, limited to
the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court improperly conclude
that the trial court correctly applied the appropriate standard
of review in this termination of parental rights case?"
In In
re Davonta V., the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's
decision to terminate a mother's parental rights on the grounds
that the mother failed to achieve a reasonable degree of rehabilitation
and termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest.
Though the mother did not contest the court's adjudicatory findings,
she argued that the trial court erroneously found that termination
was in the best interests of her child. She reasoned that the court
did not afford adequate weight to the child's ongoing ties to his
biological family and there was no adoption plan in place for the
child, then fourteen years old.
The Appellate
Court rejected the mother's contention that the trial court must
weigh the child's ties to his biological family more heavily than
other factors that relate to the best interest analysis, namely
permanency and closure. The Appellate Court also determined that
it was not error for the trial court to reject the opinion of the
Guardian ad Litem in favor of the opinions of other witnesses. Finally,
it was not error for the trial court to determine that termination
was in the best interests of the child despite the fact that the
foster parents were not committed to adoption. The trial court could
reasonably have concluded that the more important factor was that
the child was freed for adoption.
In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Schaller contended that the trial court
did not find by clear and convincing evidence that termination was
in the child's best interest. Judge Schaller reasoned that the termination
petition punished the parent and child and that termination could
not possibly be in the child's best interest if it left him without
a permanent relationship with anyone. The child adamantly wanted
to maintain relationships with his siblings and other maternal relatives.
The dissent reasoned that the child was not "liberated" by the termination
proceeding and that the "concepts of 'closure' and 'move on' [had]
little relevance to [his future]."
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