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As the appellate court notes in its written decision,
this termination of parental rights case "underscores the sad distinction
between willingness and ability to parent a child." Baby GS, having
been exposed to multiple drugs while in-utero, was removed from
his mother when he was only days old. By all accounts, the respondent
mother cooperated with every service provided for her in an effort
to address substance abuse issues and parenting skill deficiencies.
She maintained sobriety and complied with numerous parenting services.
Unfortunately, not only did the respondent mother continue to express
unease about the prospect of becoming a full time parent, multiple
service providers, including the family reunification specialist,
testified at trial that despite sustained provision of support services,
respondent mother still did not demonstrate an ability to retain
lessons taught or to parent her baby safely. The appellate court
noted that the question was not whether a parent has complied with
the specific steps, but whether the parent has benefited from that
compliance. Though the appellate court acknowledged DCF's concession
that respondent mother "displayed a complete willingness to engage
in and accomplish all that [DCF felt] necessary to successfully
parent [her baby]," it reiterated the long standing principle that
whether a parent has adequately "rehabilitated" turns on the parent's
ability to parent their child safely and consistently. Finally,
the court rejected respondent's argument that the trial court failed
to make its reasonable efforts findings by the "clear and convincing
standard." The appellate court held that the memorandum, taken as
a whole, supported the conclusion that the court applied the appropriate
standard of proof in making its decision. Moreover, the appellate
court pointed out that should there be a question as to whether
the proper standard of proof has been applied, it is incumbent upon
the challenging party to clarify the issue through a motion for
articulation.
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