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Appeal
of Termination of Parental Rights
In this
novel appeal of a termination of parental rights decision, the appellate
court rejected the respondent father’s claim that the trial court
erroneously found that he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree
of personal rehabilitation and that C.G.S. § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)
was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
Baby
Jazmyn was committed to DCF’s care as a newborn. The respondent
father was later identified through court-ordered paternity testing.
Despite an extensive criminal record and a court evaluator’s recommendation
that reunification with the father was a risky prospect, the court
ordered specific steps for reunification. DCF and the court subsequently
acknowledged the father’s progress with services and a reunification
plan was proposed. After an unsupervised overnight visit, Jazmyn,
now three years old, stated that the father had improperly touched
her private parts during a bath. Although the allegation of sexual
abuse was unsubstantiated by DCF, the father was asked to seek counseling
related to the incident. He declined to do so. DCF ultimately filed
for TPR due to the father’s failure to participate in appropriate
recommended counseling to facilitate reunification. The trial court
held that DCF failed to prove the “omission/commission” ground for
TPR and also failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the father molested his daughter. However, the trial court did find
that the father’s failure to engage in individual therapy and/or
sexual offender treatment was evidence of his failure to rehabilitate
adequate to parent Jazmyn. Both a court appointed evaluator and
an evaluator who specialized in the assessment and treatment of
sex offenders recommended individual counseling for the father if
only for him to understand the behavior he engaged in which made
his daughter uncomfortable. The appellate court therefore held that
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the father
failed to rehabilitate.
The appellate
court also rejected the respondent’s contention that § 17a-112 (j)
(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because it
failed to put him on notice that if he disagreed with a referral
for sexual offender treatment and individual therapy, and consequently
refused to attend such treatment, that his parental rights could
be terminated. The appellate court cited Supreme Court precedent
holding that ‘‘[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient
personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent
has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless
of whether those factors were included in specific expectations
ordered by the court or imposed by the department. . . . Accordingly,
successful completion of expressly articulated expectations is not
sufficient to defeat a department claim that the parent has not
achieved sufficient rehabilitation.’’ In
re Melody L.
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