|
In this
unusual case, the Appellate Court reversed a termination of parental
rights decision on the grounds that the trial court's determination
that the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification
services was clearly erroneous.
This
case began after infant Jorden suffered severe and inexplicable
injuries while in the care of his parents. DCF moved to terminate
parental rights shortly after the child's initial removal on the
ground that the child was harmed as a result of the parents' acts
of "commission or omission." DCF successfully alleged that the parents
were unable to benefit from services, thus relieving the department
of its statutory obligation to provide rehabilitation and reunification
services. On appeal the respondent mother challenged both findings.
The Appellate
Court affirmed the "omission/commission" ground for termination,
reasoning that because the child suffered injuries in the care of
his parents for which no adequate explanation was offered, there
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion.
However,
the Appellate Court found that the trial court erroneously found
that the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification
services. At trial, DCF contended that it did not have to provide
reunification services given the nature and severity of the child's
injuries. However, the trial court did not address whether the Department
was statutorily obligated to provide reunification services. Instead,
the court analyzed whether or not the respondent mother had cooperated
and benefited from services and whether she could reasonably put
herself in a position to be an appropriate parent. The
appellate court then reviewed the trial court's findings in that
regard.
The appellate
court noted that the trial court found the respondent "facially
complied" with the specific steps ordered for her. Additionally,
although there was evidence that the mother briefly renewed her
relationship with the physically abusive father, the record also
demonstrated that the mother quickly terminated that relationship,
continued with appropriate counseling and sought a restraining order
against the father. Interestingly, the trial court also accepted
testimony that the mother sought out additional counseling after
the termination petition had been filed.
The appellate
court determined that the trial court's factual finding that the
mother could not or would not benefit from these services was clearly
erroneous given ample evidence in the record of the mother's efforts
and progress with services and visitation. The appellate court also
pointedly noted the trial court's emphasis on the mother's youth
and immaturity. The appellate court observed that "[t]his circumstance
is not as uncommon as one might wish it were in today's society."
The appellate court held that the mother's youth and immaturity
were dynamic characteristics that would continue to improve over
time. The court concluded that "[it may well be the fact that the
department might be able to choose more effective parents than those
to whom many children have been born.
…[However,
as the] Supreme Court has noted, '[a] parent cannot be displaced
[simply] because someone else could do a better job of raising the
child . . . .''. The appellate court held that absent any suggestion
the respondent caused the child's injuries, she was entitled to
reasonable reunification efforts. It is unclear whether the appellate
court was ruling that the trial court's finding in this regard was
erroneous because the mother had made some progress towards services
or because she was not the perpetrator of the child's injuries and
therefore DCF was not entitled to a finding that reunification efforts
were not required.
On a
separate issue, the appellate court, citing in re David W., 254
Conn. 676 (2000), held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to preclude testimony from the respondent's independent expert
because the expert had viewed a report prepared by the court appointed
evaluator who relied on a confidential interview with the father.
The appellate court held that the trial court could have used an
alternate remedy for the violation of the father's privacy rights.
Instead, the trial court excluded relevant and highly important
information. Therefore, the decision to preclude the testimony and
report of the independent evaluator constituted harmful error.
|
