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This
termination of parental rights appeal raises important questions
regarding the impact of parental incarceration on a court's finding
that a parent has not or cannot rehabilitate, and the legal significance
that post-adoption contact with a child's biological family should
have on the court's "best interests" finding.
Jordan
was taken into DCF's temporary custody in January, 2007 after her
mother was arrested for participating in an armed robbery of a fast
food restaurant. While out on bond, the respondent mother ostensibly
complied with the specific steps, finding full-time employment and
suitable housing. She completed a parenting education course, began
out-patient counseling and visited often and appropriately with
her child. In November, she pled guilty to the criminal charge and
was incarcerated in January, 2008. The earliest possible date the
respondent could be released from incarceration was deemed to be
January, 2010. Subsequent to the respondent's incarceration, the
Department filed a petition to terminate her parental rights on
the ground that she had failed to rehabilitate or could not rehabilitate
within a reasonable period of time given the age and needs of her
child. The court ordered evaluation found that the mother faced
a number of mental-health related issues, including an adjustment
disorder, a history of alcohol dependency and adult relational problems.
The evaluator testified that he would not recommend reunification
until the mother had been back in the community for at least a year.
Additionally, the evaluator found that the reported difficulties
Jordan encountered visiting her mother in prison were likely due
to the stressful prison environment and the fact that she was anxious
for reunification to take place. Given that immediate reunification
was not an option for the child, the evaluator recommended the "least
harmful" alternative of allowing Jordan to find permanency with
another family. The evaluator also determined that while Jordan
had a few "psychological parents," her primary bond was with her
mother and her maternal family and that disruption of these "powerful
ties" in their entirety may cause her considerable harm.
The respondent
mother argued that the trial court wrongfully terminated her parental
rights because of her status as an incarcerated parent, a finding
that is not permitted when the ground for termination is "abandonment."
The respondent claimed that the evidence showed she complied with
the steps and the permanency plan was reunification up until the
time she was incarcerated on the robbery charge. Additionally, the
evidence also clearly showed that Jordan had a strong bond with
her and the extended biological family. The respondent asked the
court to find, via analogy to "abandonment" cases, that where the
alleged ground for termination is "failure to rehabilitate" a trial
court may not sustain the petition solely on the basis of the parent's
incarceration. The appellate court did not squarely address that
legal question. Instead, the court held that the trial court did
not rely exclusively on the fact of the mother's incarceration,
but rather focused on the mother's failure to admit to ongoing alcohol
dependency, the evaluator's conclusion that the mother faced myriad
mental health challenges, and the likelihood that the child could
not returned to her mother's care for at least two years, if not
longer.
The appellate
court also rejected the respondent's claim that the trial court
erroneously denied her the opportunity to question the foster parent
regarding the foster parent's alleged reluctance to permit ongoing
visitation contact between Jordan and her biological family. The
evaluator reported that the foster parent expressed unwillingness
to permit personal contact and that such reluctance may be due to
concerns about Jordan's well-being as well as insecurity about the
strength of the bond between Jordan and her maternal family. At
the time of trial, the court sustained the state's "relevancy" objection
to the respondent's questions to the foster mother about this issue.
On appeal, the court held that the trial court essentially found
that the information sought was cumulative of the evaluator's report
and testimony, and therefore unnecessary not irrelevant. The appellate
court determined, therefore, that the court's ruling did not constitute
an abuse of discretion.
Finally,
the appellate court denied the respondent's claim that the termination
was not in Jordan's best interests given her "powerful" bond with
her biological family. Though the appellate court acknowledged the
evidence in the record regarding Jordan's feelings towards her mother
and extended family, the court credited the trial court's permissible
reliance on contrary evidence regarding well-being, including the
evaluator's ultimate conclusion that because reunification was not
possible within a reasonable time period, the least detrimental
alternative was supporting the foster placement.
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