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The question in this appeal is whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the respondent mother's
request for a competency examination at a motion to revoke the child's
commitment to the Commissioner of the Department of Children and
Families ("Department"). The court upheld the trial court's decision
to deny the request primarily based on the conclusion that the respondent
mother did not raise specific factual allegations sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt as to her competence - and that the court,
though observation and assessment during the proceedings, was in
the best position to assess whether she (respondent mother) behaved
rationally at that time.
The facts of this case revolved around an incident
of domestic violence that transpired with the father of Kaleb's
siblings that occurred in March 2009 (when Caleb was four years
of age). Despite interventions provided by the Department, the Department
filed a neglect petition one year later in March 2010. On January
3, 2011, with Kaleb in the Department's custody, the respondent
mother filed a motion to revoke the commitment and motion for a
new psychological examination - claiming that the first exam was
"inaccurate as it was the first time she had taken a psychological
evaluation and she was overwhelmed."
The claim on appeal is that the denial of the
request for a competency evaluation deprived the mother of her constitutional
right to due process. Her argument relied on In re Alexander V.,
223 Conn. 613 (1992), wherein the court utilized a two-pronged approach
in considering whether to order a competency hearing in termination
of parental rights hearings. Pursuant to Alexander V., due process
requires a competency hearing only when (1) the parent's attorney
requests such a hearing, or (2) in the absence of such a request,
the conduct of the parent reasonably suggests to the court the desirability
of ordering such a hearing sua sponte. In either case, the court
must determine whether the record before it contains specific factual
allegations that, if true, would constituted substantial evidence
of mental impairment. Such evidence is substantial if it "raises
a reasonable doubt about the [parent's] competency." Id. At 566.
In this case, the respondent sought to extend
the Supreme Court's holding of Alexander V. to commitment proceedings.
Because the respondent did not allege specific allegations that
would cast doubt on her competency, the court refused to extend
the protections afforded in Alexander V. to commitment proceedings.
In this case, the court could not find that the respondent made
specific factual allegations sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
as to the mother's competency, and it rejected the respondent's
assertion that because she never agreed to the prior neglect adjudication,
she was somehow incompetent to do so. The respondent's prior testing
had revealed mild mental retardation - this did not necessarily
implicate her competence to assist in the commitment proceeding.
In addition, prior court proceedings did not raise the type of red
flags with the trial judge that might have implicated the respondent
mother's competency.
JS (10/11)
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