|
The Appellate
Court weighed in on a termination of parental rights case by affirming
a termination where issues of personal rehabilitation and vagueness
in statutory application were reviewed.
This
case was to resolve the custody issue of two of the respondent's
children, a daughter born in April 1996 and a son born in April
1999. The neglect petitions were filed by the Department of Children
and Families Commissioner in November 2001 after the respondent,
the mother of the two children, had been sentenced to jail for a
period of five years on a count of burglary in the first degree
[1]. This conviction
was the last in a long line of illegal acts leading to incarceration,
including thirteen arrests and six incarcerations in Massachusetts
for various alcohol and drug related offenses. The children were
in foster care and had begun to build a loving relationship with
their foster parents, who they even called "mom" and "dad." The
foster parents wanted to adopt the children.
In addition,
when the respondent mother was ordered by the court to participate
in a rehabilitation program, she did participate. However, the court
found that she had failed to adhere to many of the rehabilitation
requirements, including independent substance abuse counseling and
individual mental health counseling. In terminating the mother's
rights for reasons of neglect, the court found by clear and convincing
evidence that:
- "the
respondent had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation
as would encourage a belief that within a reasonable time, given
the ages, and needs for stability and permanency of both children,
she could assume a responsible position in their lives";
- "the
petitioner had proven by clear and convincing evidence that no
ongoing parent-child relationship... existed...";
- "to
allow additional time for the establishment or reestablishment
of a positive parent-child relationship would not be in the best
interest of either child"; and
- "it
was in the best interest of the children to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights" according to the statutory factors of §17a-112(k).
In applying the traditional "clearly erroneous"
standard of review, the court rejected the respondent's two challenges
to the trial court's rulings that respondent had not achieved sufficient
personal rehabilitation and that there was no ongoing parent-child
relationship [2].
The
respondent's main argument against the ruling that she had not achieved
personal rehabilitation was that the court, in ruling on the criminal
matters, had outlined specific steps that she needed to comply with
in order to remain out of jail and regain custody of her children.
These included finding a job, attending drug rehabilitation counseling,
addressing her mental health issues, etc. The court found that she
only did these things because they were court ordered; as soon as
the court order ran out, the respondent did nothing to ensure that
she remained off of drugs and alcohol and remained employed and
out of jail.
The
court stated that she complied with the court orders for her needs
only, and not because she wished to regain custody of her children.
The court found that the respondent had no motivation to remain
clean and sober and out of legal trouble and therefore had not reached
sufficient personal rehabilitation that would allow her to care
for these two children. In support of this the appellate court stated
Personal rehabilitation refers to the reasonable foreseeability
of the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive
and useful role as a parent, not merely the ability to manage his
or her own life...In determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient
personal rehabilitation, a court ay consider whether the parent
has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment ...
Furthermore,
§17a-112(j) specifically states that court ordered steps for rehabilitation
are only to "facilitate" reunion of parent and child, not to guarantee
it. The court outlines what it thinks the parent needs to do in
order regain the child's custody, and the parent can go through
the steps of that plan as they are mandated; however, there is nothing
that can force the parent to adopt the behaviors that are taught.
Attending the programs simply is not enough; the parent must also
show that he or she has adopted the behaviors and beliefs taught
in those programs.
Displaying
an unusually vituperative tone, the court dismissed the respondent's
argument that her due process claim was not preserved at trial because
the claim was not briefed adequately. The court lashed out at the
quality of the brief, finding that the respondent had cited vagueness
challenges to § 117a-12(j)(3)(B) by taking "a rather cut-and-paste
approach to the facts, language and holding of [other states' and
Connecticut cases]." The rather ad hominem attack seemingly contradicts
the lauding tone of the same court's praise of identical counsel
who authored and argued Alexander T., 81 Conn. App. 668 (2004),
where the court indicated that commendations were due for the "counsel
for the ... respondent . . . for their excellent briefs and oral
arguments." Id. at 669.
This
case may be accessed by going to the Judicial Branch website at
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP83/83ap343.pdf
(Johanna Gordon, Legal Intern 7/04)
[1]
Mom, while high on cocaine, had robbed a store and held up the store
clerk, a 70 year old elderly man, at knife point before cutting him
with it.
[2]
The latter of the two challenges is not addressed since the first
is dispositive of the case.
|
