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The Supreme
Court, reversing the judgment of the Appellate Court, held that
the Department of Children and Families could not be held in contempt
for violating the court-ordered Specific Steps which mandated that
the Department "ensure the [child's] wellbeing" and "provide appropriate
services." The Court determined, ironically, that the Specific Steps
were too vague to support a finding of contempt.
In April
2003, the Department took custody of Leah S. via an order of Temporary
Custody, alleging that, despite Leah's extensive mental health history,
her parents failed to cooperate with physicians' and the Department's
recommendations for treatment. At the time of Leah's removal from
her parents' home, she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had
a long history of destructive behavior, violence toward animals,
and previous psychiatric hospitalizations for suicidal ideation.
Accordingly, when Leah was taken into DCF custody, the court issued
Specific Steps requiring the Department to ensure Leah's wellbeing
and provide appropriate case management and therapeutic services.
However,
despite the severity of Leah's psychiatric needs and despite clinical
recommendations for therapeutic placement in a specially licensed
foster home or residential facility, Leah languished in a series
of inappropriate, non-therapeutic foster placements. By September,
2003, she was living in her fourth foster placement and she still
had yet to receive psychiatric treatment. .
In October,
2003, Leah was adjudicated neglected, and the court supplemented
the Specific Steps by ordering the Department to facilitate counseling
between Leah and her sibling. Meanwhile, records indicated that
Leah continued to deteriorate in her foster placement. She suffered
from possible overmedication, and she was increasingly estranged
from her biological family.
In November
2003, Leah's mother filed a contempt motion against the Department,
alleging that the Department's failure to provide Leah appropriate
services was harming her and delaying the family's reunification.
The Superior Court found the Department in contempt of the court-ordered
Specific Steps. The court ordered the Department to pay $500 to
Leah's mother to assist with her attorney's fees.
On appeal,
the Department contended that the relevant orders contained in the
Specific Steps were too "ambiguous" to serve as the basis for a
contempt finding. The Department looked to past case law holding
that in order to be found in contempt of a court order, the contemnor
must have had adequate notice of the court's expectations. The Appellate
Court rejected this argument, holding that the Specific Steps provided
"ample direction" to the Department regarding its obligation to
provide appropriate care for Leah. The Appellate Court also determined
that, to the extent the Department did not understand its obligations,
it was the Department's responsibility to "seek clarification" of
the court orders.
The
Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that
the orders were indeed too ambiguous to support a finding of contempt.
The Court also took the opportunity to clarify the standard of review
for contempt decisions. The threshold question is whether the underlying
court order is sufficient clear to support a contempt finding. Secondly,
the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a contempt judgment.
The Court
held that in this case the first requirement was not satisfied.
The underlying order must require the person to do or refrain from
doing an act or series of acts using "specific and definite language".
Here, the "imprecise wording" of the Specific Steps afforded the
Department great discretion regarding the services it provided.
Nothing in the Steps clarified or defined the meaning of "necessary
measures" or "appropriate services." The Steps did not specify whether
Leah should have been placed in a therapeutic foster home or residential
treatment facility. The Court also held that it was not, as the
Appellate Court held, the Department's obligation to "clarify" the
Steps. Previous case law held that where a party was bound by a
court order and circumstances relative to the court order changed,
the party was not permitted to resort to "self help" and independently
determine whether its obligations continued. Rather, the party must
return to the court to clarify or modify the order. Here, the Department
did not impermissibly resort to "self help" measures. The Specific
Steps were ambiguous from the outset. Accordingly, there was no
basis for a contempt finding.
Although
the Court reversed the contempt finding, it did confirm that trial
courts enjoy broad authority to issue Specific Steps and augment
those Steps with supplemental orders to facilitate family wellbeing
and reunification. The Court stated that such "concomitant reunification
efforts on the part of the parents and the department help to preserve
the integrity of the family and are based on the well settled notion
that the right of a parent to raise his or her children is recognized
as basic constitutional right." The Court also noted that both the
mother and the Department agreed that the Specific Steps constitute
court orders and that failure to comply with such an order may result
in a contempt finding.
Finally,
the Court concluded that though it was compelled to reverse the
Appellate Court judgment, it did not condone the Department's treatment
of Leah S or the fact that it took a contempt motion to get the
Department to provide appropriate and timely services.
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