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TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: DUE PROCESS, RIGHTS OF INCARCERATED FATHER.
2010 The appellate court denied the incarcerated father’s claim
that his due process rights were violated when the court failed
to grant his motion for transcripts and a continuance of the termination
of parental rights trial. Firstly, the court found that it must
apply the Golding standard of review as constitutional nature of
the requests for continuance and transcripts were not clearly articulated
to the trial court. Thus, applying the Golding and Matthews v. Eldridge
analytical framework, the appellate court found that the father’s
claim failed on the third Golding prong: there was no actual violation
of his procedural due process rights. The court, distinguishing
the respondent’s case from arguably similar precedents involving
the due process rights of incarcerated parties where due process
violations were noted, held that the state did not play a role in
making the father unavailable to participate in the trial, and that
the father and his counsel initially averred that father would be
available for the trial and that the father did not file timely
motions in advance of trial to notify the court of the need for
a continuance. Accordingly, the appellate court found that there
were no procedural irregularities that rendered the trial “fundamentally
unfair.” The court also rejected the father’s claim that the trial
court’s denial of his request to participate in the trial via videoconferencing
violated his due process rights. The appellate court, again applying
the Matthews standard of review, acknowledged the importance of
the liberty interest at stake but held that there was little risk
of erroneous deprivation of that interest as a result of the inability
to participate by videoconference. The respondent could participate
by telephone conference on the first day of the trial and was ably
represented by counsel for the duration of the trial.
Next,
the court denied the respondent father’s claim that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence of criminal conduct
which pre-dated the respondent’s relationship with the child’s mother.
The appellate court held that such evidence was relevant to establishing
whether the father engaged in a course of conduct that rendered
him unable to support an ongoing parent-child relationship, and
that regardless the respondent could not demonstrate that he was
substantially prejudiced by the evidence.
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