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In In
re Nasia B., the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's
decision dismissing the state's termination of parental rights petition
for failure to establish a prima facie case. The Court also reversed
the trial court's sua sponte decision to revoke DCF's custody of
the minor child and place the child at home under protective supervision.
Based
on the Appellate Court's recounting, the parents suffered a history
of substance abuse, mental health breakdowns and incarceration.
Until the termination petitions were filed, the parents had made
sporadic efforts to comply with the court ordered specific steps.
The state sought to terminate the parents' rights on the grounds
that the father abandoned the child and the mother failed to sufficiently
rehabilitate. The parents' compliance with services and visits subsequently
increased.
The termination
petition went to trial. At the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief,
the respondent parents orally moved to dismiss. The court granted
the motion and also rejected the state's permanency plan on the
ground that the plan was not in the child's best interest. The court
ordered the parties to return in one day to explain the plan for
reunification. The following day, after conversing with counsel
and questioning the DCF case supervisor, the court ordered that
the child's commitment to DCF be opened and that DCF return the
child to her parents under protective supervision.
The Appellate
Court held that the dismissal was inappropriate because the trial
court did not apply the correct standard in ruling on the parents'
oral motion. Rather than consider whether the state put forth sufficient
evidence that, if believed, would establish a prima facie case,
the trial court weighed the credibility of the state's evidence
and ruled accordingly. When a motion to dismiss is filed, the evidence
must be accepted as true and all inferences must be drawn in favor
of the non-moving party. Here, the trial court stated that it issued
its findings after "having reviewed the evidence presented and assessed
the credibility of the witnesses." The Appellate Court held that
the state had indeed presented a prima facie case that grounds existed
for termination of parental rights.
Secondly,
the Court held that it was improper for the trial court to sua sponte
revoke the child's commitment to DCF. Pursuant to the plain language
of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129 (m) and (o), as well as the requirements
of due process, commitment may only be revoked after written motions
are filed.
The Appellate
Court did not decide whether evidence supported revocation of commitment
or termination of parental rights.
The case
may be found on the Judicial Branch website at www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP98/98AP12.pdf
(Sarah
Eagan, Staff Attorney 11/06)
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