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In this
“failure to rehabilitate” TPR appeal, the court affirmed the termination
of the mother’s parental rights and concluded that DCF had made
reasonable efforts to reunify her with her child. The record indicated
that the mother had a history with DCF dating back 10 years and
had struggled with domestic violence, mental illness and substance
abuse. While the record indicated that the mother successfully completed
one recovery program and demonstrated a certain amount of insight
in therapy, her record of recovery was extremely spotty. She failed
to complete one substance abuse program and failed to show for all
scheduled drug screens. In the early fall of 2003, she began missing
visits with her child and then dropped off of DCF’s radar screen
altogether. In November, 2003, DCF discovered that the mother had
been arrested and incarcerated on insurance fraud charges, and was
facing a maximum sentence of five years in jail. While in prison,
the mother apparently successfully completed certain service programs.
Evidence at trial also indicated that the mother had a demonstrative
bond with her son and displayed genuine love and nurturance for
him.
Despite
the mother’s belated compliance with services, the appellate court
held that the trial reasonably considered the mother’s history of
relapse and the testimony of an expert witness who opined that the
mother had a high risk of substance abuse and would not be in a
position to responsibly parent in the near future. The appellate
court also affirmed the trial court’s decision that termination
was in the best interests of the child despite evidence of the loving
relationship between the mother and Ryan R. The court cited multiple
cases holding that “even when there is a finding of a bond between
parent and a child, it still may be in the child’s best interest
to terminate parental rights.”
Ryan
R. highlights the need for parents to show signs of significant
rehabilitation early and throughout the life of a case. Belated
compliance with services and specific steps may not negate the court’s
impression that the parent failed to truly “rehabilitate.” The decision
also notes the connection between the “failure to rehabilitate”
finding and the “best interests” finding. Here, despite the acknowledged
bond between parent and child, the court found that the mother’s
lack of sustained progress with services militated in favor of a
conclusion that termination was in the best interests of her child.
A noteworthy
aspect of this relatively straightforward case is the footnoted
comment by the appellate court expressing doubt as to whether a
minor is a party to a termination proceeding with a corresponding
right of appeal. However, Connecticut Practice Book § 32a-1 clearly
provides that the child or youth has the right of confrontation
and cross-examination and may be represented by counsel “in each
and every phase of any and all proceedings in juvenile matters,
including appeals” and that “[t]he judicial counsel shall appoint
counsel for these parties … in the case of counsel for the child,
whether a request is made or not, in any proceeding on a juvenile
matter in which the custody of a child is at issue…”. (Emphasis
added.) Additionally, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129a provides unequivocally
that the child “shall be represented by counsel knowledgeable about
representing such children…”. Despite the appellate court’s uncertainty
regarding this issue, the court’s footnote goes on to note the recent
Supreme Court holding that ‘‘[i]n cases involving parental rights,
the rights of the child coexist and are intertwined with those of
the parent, [and] [t]he legal disposition of the parent’s rights
with respect to the child necessarily affects and alters the rights
of the child with respect to his or her parent.’’ (quoting In re
Christina M., 280 Conn. 474 (2006)). The court concluded, however,
that the issue was presently moot as the parent and child raised
the same issues on appeal.
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