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In this
unusual case, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial
of the state's TPR petition. The appellate court held that the trial
court's decision that the state failed to make its "failure to rehabilitate"
case was clearly erroneous. The appellate court remanded for further
proceedings.
In this
case, the respondent mother had a long history with DCF, and she
struggled with substance abuse and domestic violence issues before
and after DCF took her children away in 2004. In early 2005, DCF
filed a motion to terminate the mother's parental rights, and trial
started in December, 2005, with additional dates in January, March
and May, 2006.
In January,
2006, the mother, now in the early stages of pregnancy, began a
drug rehabilitation program at ADRC in Hartford. Twenty-eight days
later, the mother entered a residential mother/child substance-abuse
treatment program. During the March trial dates, the court heard
testimony that the mother was engaged in services at Coventry House,
and that the residential program typically lasted between 9 and
12 months.
Testimony
in the trial continued in May. In June, 2006, DCF made a motion
to "open the evidence," which was objected to by the mother's attorney.
DCF withdrew its motion in July. In September, the trial court orally
issued its decision to deny the TPR petition. The court observed
that the mother had made substantial strides with her sobriety since
the beginning of the TPR trial, and that she had been compliant
with the Coventry House program for nine months. On the basis of
these facts, the court ruled that the mother may achieve personal
rehabilitation within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, the
court denied the state's TPR petition and this appeal followed.
The appellate
court ruled that the key fact that the trial court relied
on, i.e. that the mother was in Coventry House for 9 months,
was not a fact in evidence, because the only evidence that judge
had that mom was in Coventry House was offered during the March
trial date, at which time she had only been in the treatment program
for about two months. So, the key fact in the court's
decision was speculative. Further, the appellate court took
judicial notice of the fact that DCF was granted emergency custody
of the mother's newborn baby in early September, 2006, weeks prior
to the trial court's denial of the TPR petition. The appellate
decision footnotes reveal that the mother was discharged from Coventry
House by the end of June, 2006 due to her noncompliance with program
requirements, and that when she gave birth to her new baby, the
child's meconium tested positive for cocaine. Accordingly, the
key fact that the trial court relied on was not only speculative,
but erroneous. It is unclear why the trial court was unaware
of the mother's relapse, her eviction from Coventry House or the
state's recent removal of the mother's newborn baby.
In sum,
the appellate court held that because trial court's decision rested
on speculative and erroneous facts, the decision must be reversed.
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