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How
much intervention should be allowed by an intervenor at a revocation
hearing? The answer, according to the Appellate Court in Shanaira
C., is not as much as the intervenor would have liked. The court
upheld the trials court's revocation of commitment, despite a thoughtful
and well-reasoned dissenting argument.
The
issues stem from allegations of medical and educational neglect,
as well as domestic violence and drug abuse in Shanaira's home.
In March 2006, the Department of Children and Families (Department)
sought and was granted an order of temporary custody, whereupon
Shanaira's father's girlfriend, Stephanie E., moved not only to
intervene in the case, but also filed motions to transfer guardianship
of Shanaira to herself, and for visitation. At a three-day trial
in October 2006, the court adjudicated Shanaira neglected, and denied
Stephanie's motions for guardianship and visitation. On December
15, 2006, the court heard the Department's motion to revoke Shanaira's
commitment on the ground that reunification with her mother in Florida
was in her best interest. Stephanie opposed the motion, indicating
her desire to introduce testimony from her mother and Shanaira's
aunt (who was also the foster mother). After hearing testimony from
the aunt, Stephanie, Shanaira's teacher, and on the basis of statements
by counsel and reports submitted by the Department, the court revoked
Shanaira's commitment and granted sole custody to the respondent
mother.
The first
issue on appeal was whether Stephanie had standing as an intervenor
to bring the appeal. Citing Practice Book § 35a-4 (intervention
permitted in dispositional phase of the trial), the court found
that because the court's ruling revoking the commitment was adverse
to the intervenor's interest in the dispositional phase of the neglect
petition, Stephanie had standing to bring the appeal.
As to
her claim that the court violated her due process rights by failing
to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to revoke commitment,
the court used the time-honored Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) test, which requires a consideration of the private interest
that will be affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable
value, if any of additional or substitute procedural safeguard -
weighing the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirements would entail. The record indicated
that Stephanie participated in every aspect of the neglect proceedings,
including the revocation hearing, filing motions, cross-examining
witnesses, calling witnesses on her behalf, and making arguments
to the court. It also noted that it was not apparent that permitting
Stephanie's mother to testify or allowing the Stephanie to introduce
the testimony of Shanaira's aunt herself would have elicited any
facts that were not already before the court.
In addition,
Stephanie's interest in the proceedings had diminished by the time
the court ruled on the revocation of commitment motion due to the
fact that her motions for guardianship and visitation had already
been denied. In addition, the court found that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in revoking the commitment despite its
failure to make a finding that a cause for commitment no longer
existed. Noting the sparse record on appeal, the court inferred
from the neglect petition that the allegations of neglect concerned
Shanaira's father, whom she was living with at the time the neglect
petition was filed. In addition, the court "talked extensively"
about the mother's fitness to care for Shanaira - which translated
into a conclusion that there was no longer a cause for commitment.
In a
lengthy dissent, Justice Borden agreed with the majority's finding
regarding Stephanie's standing to bring the appeal - but disagreed
with the conclusion her due process rights were not violated. He
agreed with the intervenor's contention that she was entitled to
a proper evidentiary hearing pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129(m)
and Practice Book 35a-14(c) and the hearing that was provided violated
her due process rights.
The
majority opinion may be found at www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP105/105AP111.pdf
The dissent
may be found at www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP105/105AP111E.pdf
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