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In a
markedly split decision, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision to terminate the respondent mother's parental rights
on failure to rehabilitate grounds. A primary issue at trial was
whether the mother's apparent progress with substance abuse treatment
and her current parenting of a newborn child were sufficient to
demonstrate that she could resume a responsible parental role in
young Tremaine's life. The trial court held that the mother's ongoing
struggles with dysfunctional behavior, lack of employment, and transient
living, combined with her uneven visitation record, warranted a
finding that she had not constructively rehabilitated. The court
noted the mother's progress with substance abuse treatment and the
fact that the mother had not tested positive for drugs for a long
period. However, the court observed that her care of the newborn
was both "marginal" and newfound and therefore could not support
a finding that she had gained an ability to care for Tremaine.
The dissent
disagreed, contending that the trial court's memorandum of decision
lacked support for both the adjudicative and dispositional findings.
The dissent pointed out that the evidence undisputedly demonstrated
that at the time of the termination trial, the mother had made marked
progress with substance abuse treatment, was living in the community
with a family support network, caring for her newborn child and
was visiting regularly with baby Tremaine. Furthermore, there was
no evidentiary basis to conclude that the mother was unable to benefit
from the services she received or that she could not, within a reasonable
period of time, fulfill the remaining specific steps, stable housing
and legal income, particular given her sobriety.
The dissent
noted its previously stated opinion that "where the factual findings
implicate a [respondent's] constitutional rights and the credibility
of witnesses is not the primary issue … a scrupulous examination
of the record [should be undertaken] to ensure that the findings
are supported by substantial evidence." Here, the dissent added,
it would reverse even under the clearly erroneous standard of review
as the trial court "failed to support its termination decision with
any supporting evidence, much less by clear and convincing evidence."
As to
disposition, the dissent contended that there was no factual support
in the memorandum of decision for the finding that termination of
parental rights was in the child's best interests. Rather, the trial
court made a mere "conclusory determination that the child's best
interest would be served by termination." The court also failed
to explain its consideration of the seven dispositional factors
outlined in CGS 17a-112(k). Moreover, the trial court's decision
contained "sheer speculation" regarding the child's adoptive prospects.
At the time of trial, the child had been living with a foster family
since birth. Because the foster family had decided not to adopt
him, he was being transferred to a relative pre-adoptive family,
but the family had not yet met certain licensing requirements. Therefore,
it was speculative to assume that the proposed adoptive family would
become licensed and eventually adopt the child. At the same time,
Tremaine was visiting with his mother regularly and her actions
during visitation were deemed appropriate. According to the dissent,
at trial the state did not present any specific information about
the child except for his date or birth and the fact that he was
born with cocaine in his system. Indeed, even the court-appointed
psychologist, Dr. Kelly Rogers, testified that he did not have enough
information to advocate for termination.
Lastly,
the dissent concluded that the state had not made reasonable efforts
to reunify Tremaine and his mother. First, though DCF knew of the
mother's progress with substance abuse treatment and that she was
caring for her newborn child, it did not increase the frequency
of her visitation (which had been reduced due to previous failures).
Second, although DCF indicated that it could not find subsidized
housing for the respondent as long as she was drug dependent, the
agency failed to make further efforts to assist with housing once
DCF learned of the mother's sobriety.
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