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In another
termination of parental rights case that focused on the issue of
personal rehabilitation, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed
a trial court's termination of rights on the strong facts indicating
failure to rehabilitate and a mother's failure to admit that abuse
and maltreatment was part of her history with her child.
Vanna
A., was first adjudicated neglected at 15 months of age and was
placed under protective supervision; her mother retained custody
of Vanna but was required to undergo counseling for personal rehabilitation.
While still in protective supervision, DCF filed a second neglect
petition, this time based on Vanna's inadequately explained injuries,
malnutrition, and improper medical care. With the mother's agreement,
the child was placed in DCF's custody.
Two
days later, the mother filed a motion to revoke Vanna's commitment
to DCF. The motion was denied based on the mother's continued failure
to take responsibility for Vanna's injuries. The court ordered that
she address this responsibility in counseling and initiated a permanency
plan calling for eventual reunification. However, when the permanency
plan's goals were not met, a third neglect petition, this time also
alleging abuse, was filed. The court again adjudicated Vanna neglected.
DCF moved to terminate the mother's parental rights based on two
grounds: (1) failure to rehabilitate and (2) the lack of a parent-child
relationship.
After
a contested hearing, the court terminated the mother's parental
rights based on four conclusions: (1) DCF had made reasonable efforts
to reunite the family; (2) the mother did not achieve sufficient
personal rehabilitation to satisfy CONN. GEN. STAT. §17a-112(j)(3)(B);
(3) there was no parent-child relationship for purposes of CONN.
GEN. STAT. §17a-112(j)(3)(D); and (4) it was in the best interest
of Vanna to have the mother's parental rights terminated. On appeal,
the four conclusions made by the trial court were affirmed along
with the decision to terminate parental rights.
The appellate
court reasoned that the evidence presented by DCF during the hearing
was sufficient to support the finding that the mother failed to
achieve personal rehabilitation. The court stated that for purposes
of §17a-112(j)(3)(B), in order to determine if personal rehabilitation
has been reached,
the trial court [must] analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status
as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further,
that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable
time.... The statute requires the court to find by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's level of rehabilitation is less than
that which would encourage a belief that he or she can assume a
responsible position in the child's life within a reasonable time…[I]f
the parent produces sufficient evidence to encourage the belief
that rehabilitation is foreseeable within a reasonable time, the
court cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that such rehabilitation
cannot be achieved. [1]
As evidence
that rehabilitation had not been achieved nor was foreseeable in
the near future, the court focused on the fact that the mother was
unable to take responsibility for Vanna's injuries and had been
incarcerated on at least three occasions. In fact, heavy reliance
was placed on the fact that even on the filing date of the petition
to terminate her rights, the mother was in jail. The court saw her
continued involvement with the criminal justice system as a "lack
of insight in to the importance of meeting that step toward unification
with her child…[B]y her actions, the [mother] elevated her desires
over the child's need for her as a mother." [2]
In addition, the court noted that the finding that the mother did
not reach personal rehabilitation was sufficient grounds to also
support the trial court's conclusion that there was no parent-child
relationship between Vanna and her mother.
In order
to support the finding that it was in Vanna's best interest to terminate
the mother's parental rights, the court looked to Conn. Gen. Stat.
§17a-221(k) which requires that the trial court make written findings
about the seven factors listed in the statute. Although the court
made this written finding, the mother argued that reasonable efforts
at reunification were not made because DCF only provided her with
referrals for counseling without directly providing an actual service
as required. The appellate court did not agree. It stated that DCF
made every effort to arrange services for the mother in order for
'her' to address her issues. These services failed not because they
were not the direct services of DCF, but because the mother was
unable to admit that she had a problem or that she had abused Vanna.
Because she could not make this admission, if there was reunification,
it was likely that Vanna would again be subjected to abuse.
The
case may be accessed by going to the Judicial Branch web site at
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP83/83ap290.pdf
Johanna
Gordon, Legal Intern (7/04)
[1]
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted), p. 23.
[2]
P. 24
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