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TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS/REHABILITATION/BEST INTERESTS
This
termination of parental rights appeal underscores the sometimes
heartbreaking proposition that an even commendable personal progress
will not defeat a claim that a parent has failed to achieve adequate
"parental" rehabilitation. The case also highlights the influence
that court-appointed evaluators can have on the findings of the
trial court. In re Zion R involves a mother with a long history
of problems with substance abuse, domestic violence, mental illness
and incarceration who was in the midst of a successful stay in a
rigorous, long-term substance program when her parental rights were
terminated on "failure to rehabilitate" grounds.
Prior
to baby Zion's removal in September, 2006, the respondent mother
declined to accept or did not make progress with numerous services,
including individual counseling, domestic violence services and
shelter, and intensive family preservation services. In January,
2007, the mother voluntarily entered the long-term Youth Challenge
program ,a structured substance abuse program with a religious focus.
DCF told the mother that the program did not meet the needs of reunifying
her with her child because of the duration of the program (12-18
months), the fact that the child could not live with the mother
and bond with her in the program, and the difficulty the department
would have in assessing the mother's progress in learning to live
in the community. Though, the Department offered several alternative
residential programs where the mother and child could be placed
together, the respondent decided to remain in Youth Challenge. In
September, 2007, the Department filed for termination of parental
rights.
At trial,
the respondent pointed out that the Youth Challenge program was
included as an identified service in the court-ordered specific
steps, the so-called "blue print" for reunification agreed to by
the parties at the onset of a child protection case. The respondent
also offered testimony regarding the rigors and structure of the
Youth Challenge program, her great degree of progress with program
goals, and her achievement of greater freedom and responsibilities
within the program. The respondent testified that she was looking
for employment and seeking housing at the time of the trial.
While
the trial court credited the respondent for her efforts with the
Youth Challenge program, the court gave great weight to the report
of the court appointed evaluator, who did not recommend reunification.
The evaluator, who noted the respondent's intellectual deficiencies
and significant history of mental illness and substance abuse, determined
that despite the mother's recent success with services, her problems
were deep seated and ingrained and he considered her a high risk
for substance abuse relapse. He recommended that the mother be re-evaluated
after six months in the community before reunification even be considered.
Referencing
the evaluator's report, the court concluded that the mother had
not demonstrated an ability to live successfully in the community;
she did not have a job or an apartment; she had not engaged in a
recognized program for domestic violence counseling; and had not
demonstrated how her mental health issues would be addressed in
the future. The court determined that the respondent had demonstrated
much "personal" rehabilitation, but had not shown that she had undergone
"parental" rehabilitation. Specifically, the court found that the
mother had not demonstrated that she could live in an unstructured
environment and cope with the burdens of child rearing. The appellate
court, citing numerous precedents, held that personal progress,
and even compliance with court-ordered services does not automatically
translate into a judicial finding that a parent has achieved a sufficient
degree of rehabilitation necessary to parent a particular child.
The appellate court also held that the trial court did not err when
it relied on the evaluator's report for a finding that the mother
could not rehabilitate within a reasonably foreseeable period of
time. Finally, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's best
interests finding, holding that the court reasonably emphasized
the young age of the child and the corresponding need for permanency
when making a determination that termination of parental rights
was warranted.
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