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The Connecticut
Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether pursuant to Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 48a-58(a), the state Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
("CHRO") has the jurisdictional authority to address a student's
claim of racial discrimination against school personnel and the
local school board on the basis of discrete course of allegedly
discriminatory conduct by the school principal in violation of Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 10-15c and § 46a-58(a). In a long and thoughtful decision,
the Court finds that by implication, CHRO shares concurrent jurisdiction
with the state Board of Education over such discrimination claims.
Ballard,
a Cheshire high school student, filed a complaint with CHRO against
the Cheshire Board of Education and the principal of Cheshire High
School alleging racial discrimination. The complaint was substantiated
primarily by two allegations of misconduct. The first was an incident
wherein the principal suspended only Ballard, an African American
student, after he and a friend were involved in a physical altercation
with a Caucasian student. The principal's disciplinary action violated
school policy mandating that all those who participate in fights
are to be suspended. The other incident involved the principal's
ongoing failure to take action after Ballard made multiple reports
alleging continued racial discrimination by the white student.
Ballard
filed a complaint with CHRO but the presiding administrative referee
granted the board of education's motion to dismiss. After CHRO appealed,
the superior court dismissed the appeal with regard to the student
on the basis of mootness. Both parties appealed; CHRO challenging
the dismissal of the student's appeal and the defendants challenging
the trial court's decision that CHRO had jurisdiction over the complaint.
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal as to the student and affirmed
the judgment that CHRO had jurisdiction over the student's complaint.
Prior
to addressing the principal jurisdictional issue, the court discusses
the questions of whether the trial court's remand to CHRO was a
final judgment for purposes of the court's appellate subject matter
jurisdiction and whether the appeal was moot as to Ballard. With
regard to the issue of mootness, the court found that despite the
student not having filed his own separate appeal and his lack of
formal participation in CHRO's appeal, the student's appeal was
not moot because CHRO could grant compensatory damages under § 46a-86(c)
as a remedy for discrimination in violation of § 46a-58(a). On the
issue involving the finality of the remand, the court relies on
the statutory language in § 4-183 (j) and concludes that because
the remand was issued pursuant to §4-183 (j) it is a final judgment
for purposes of appeal, irrespective of the nature of the remand
and the administrative proceedings that are expected to follow.
In doing so, the court overruled its prior holding in Morel
v. Comm'r. of Public Health, 262 Conn. 222 (2002) and rejects
dictum in Lisee v. CHRO, 258 Conn. 533 (2001) both of which
asserted the proposition that only those remands based on erroneous
administrative rulings, requiring further administrative proceedings,
and not those based on incomplete rulings requiring further evidentiary
findings, were final judgments.
After
undergoing a careful analysis of relevant statutes and comparing
their language and legislative histories, the court concludes that
the legislature intended that CHRO has the broad authority to handle
claims of distinct discriminatory conduct by school personnel and
local school boards. In support of its conclusion, the court points
to the broad language of § 46a-58(a), specifically that which indicates
the protection of "any" person against deprivation of "any rights,
privileges or immunities." The court also finds evidence of the
legislature's intent to vest broad authority in CHRO within the
legislative history of § 46a-58(a). The court finds most noteworthy
those amendments providing for the expansion of the statute to include
additional basis discrimination including sex, blindness, physical
disability, religion and national origin, and those that granted
CHRO the authority to investigate and prosecute complaints and to
award damages.
The court
further determines that the legislature did not intend that the
state board be the exclusive remedial agency through which to address
student claims of discriminatory conduct of school officials. The
court rejects the defendants' various claims that the state board
has exclusive jurisdiction; 1) pursuant to §§ 10-4b and 10-15 [1],
2) because the specific provisions of § 10-15c prevail over the
general provisions of § 46a-58, 3) due to the legislature's silence
following CHRO's own rulings that it lacked jurisdiction over such
matters, and 4) because the state board possesses special expertise
in public school issues. In refuting these claims, the court highlights
the absence of any specific language in § 10-15c or § 10-4b conferring
exclusive jurisdiction to the state board, a lack of focus in the
statutory authority on individual claims of discrimination, and
a history of the state board's lack of enforcement power. In response
to the defendants' last two claims the court emphasizes the unreliability
of legislative silence in determining intent due to its ambiguity
and the expertise that CHRO possesses in discrimination claims.
The court
emphasized the narrow applicability of its holding to claims that
allege discrete acts of discriminatory conduct. It thereby refutes
the dissent's prediction that the ruling will invite individual
claims based on violations of those rights protected under Sheff
v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1 (1996). The court describes the discrimination
in the Sheff case as involving "systemic racial isolation" distinguishing
it from the "discrete acts of discriminatory conduct" alleged in
the present case. On a separate issue, the court does not believe
that its ruling will render the state board's jurisdiction redundant,
citing both the doctrine of election of remedies and various reasons
why a individual complainant may prefer to pursue a complaint with
the state board instead of the CHRO, including the state board's
ability to address systemic problems.
The
case may be accessed by going to the state Judicial Branch website
at www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR270/270cr121.pdf.
(Erin
Duques, Legal Intern)
[1]
§ 10-15c prohibits acts of discrimination that may interfere with
a child's equal opportunity to participate in public school activities,
programs and courses of study. § 10-4b provides a set of remedies
for violations of those proscriptions against discrimination as
set forth in § 10-15c.
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