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See
In re Steven M.: 264 Conn. 747 (2003) for a summary of the appeal
of this case in the Connecticut Supreme Court.
In an
important decision limiting the Department of Children and Families’
(“Department”) inherent power to unilaterally transfer a mentally
disabled juvenile delinquent from a Department facility to a correctional
institution, the appellate court held that the trial court, at the
very least, was obligated to make a finding that the transfer was
in the trial court’s best interest in order to protect the juvenile’s
right of due process. The youth is a mentally disabled man with
the intellect of a four or five year old who reached the age of
majority (18) after he filed the appeal. The Department moved to
transfer him from Long Lane School (a Department facility) to the
Manson Youth Institution (a correctional facility) claiming he was
dangerous to himself and others. The court ordered the transfer,
despite not determining the child’s competency. The court tackled
two main issues.
First,
the Department’s mootness claim (because the child reached his eighteenth
birthday after he filed the appeal) failed because the case met
all three criteria to the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
mootness doctrine. Second, the court agreed with the young man’s
claim that he had been denied due process of law because the court
failed to determine his competency prior to ordering his transfer
to a correctional institution. Because the child had been diagnosed
with dysthymia, conduct disorder, mild mental retardation and a
borderline personality disorder, there was significant concern regarding
his competency with respect to pending adult criminal proceedings.
The court noted that the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
the child’s interests was not in itself enough of a safeguard his
constitutionally protected liberty interest. Since the state’s inherent
duty is to protect the “best interest of the child,” the court had
a duty to evaluate competency prior to such a transfer.
In a
strongly worded concurrence, Chief Judge Lavery noted that the Department
had “breached its duty” owed to the juvenile because it failed to
offer him “adequate treatment programs corresponding to [his] individual
[need]. He wrote the concurrence “so that no mentally handicapped
child will ever have to suffer the debilitating treatment suffered
by the respondent.”
The case
may be viewed at http://www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/68ap204.pdf
in PDF format. (JES 3/02)
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