Case:
Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy
___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 165 L. Ed. 2d 526 (2006)
Education
U.S. Supreme Court
June 26, 2006
The omnipresent and always
controversial issue of attorneys' fees in special education found
a path all the way to the Supreme Court this past term. In Arlington
Central School Dist. v. Murphy, the plaintiffs sought fees for
services rendered by an educational consultant used during legal
proceedings held pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA"). Despite their status as the "prevailing party" in
the lengthy litigation, the Supreme Court overturned the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals by holding that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)
does not authorizing prevailing parents to recover expert fees.
The Murphys (Pearl and Theodore)
filed an action in United States District Court on behalf of their
son, Joseph, seeking the school district and Supreme Court petitioner
(Arlington Central) to pay for Joseph's private school tuition for
specified school years. The Murphys prevailed in District Court
and the Second Circuit affirmed the decision. As a prevailing party
pursuant to IDEA, the Murphys sought $29,000 in fees paid to an
educational consultant, who assisted them throughout the proceedings.
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling that the
educational consultant's fee could be reimbursed, but only for $8,650,
which represented the time actually spend after the request for
an administrative had been filed.
The Supreme Court granted
review in an attempt to resolve a split amongst the Circuits with
respect to whether Congress authorized the compensation of expert
fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. In its reversal of the
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court relied on two grounds:
First - by way of background,
the Court noted that Congress enacted IDEA pursuant to the Spending
Clause of the Constitution, which requires that acceptance of federal
funds by states, must be set out "unambiguously." Thus, the question
in this case is whether IDEA furnishes clear notice regarding expert
fees. And here, while IDEA provides an award of "reasonable attorneys'
fees" for prevailing parties, the text of § 1415(i)(3)(B) does not
authorize the award of additional expert fees, and it "fails to
provide the clear notice that is required under the spending clause."
Second, the Court relied
on Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, 482 U.S. 437 (1987)
and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83 (1991) - both cases interpreting federal rules and statutes (Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 respectively). The thrust
of the analysis rests on the analogies in the respective cases -
where witness fees and attorneys' fees were denied because they
were not enumerated in the analogous statutes.
In an interesting dissent,
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, argued that
Congress' intent, as evidenced by a 1986 conference report, was
to include reasonable expenses of expert witnesses and reasonable
costs of any test or evaluation which was found to be necessary
for the preparation of the parent or guardian's case "in the action
or proceeding." Based on this section of H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687,
p.5 (1986), Justice Breyer finds "no good reason for [the Court]
to interpret the language of [IDEA] as meaning the precise opposite
of what Congress told us it intended."
