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In 1995,
J.C.’s parents requested that the Connecticut Regional School District
10 evaluate him for possible learning disabilities but they failed
to do so. Consequently, in the fall of 1997, J.C.’s parents reiterated
their request. This time the school agreed to hold a PPT meeting
and J.C. was found to exhibit signs of ADHD. As a result of these
findings, J.C. underwent a psychological assessment but the PPT
ultimately decided that special education services or accommodations
were not warranted. A year later, J.C.’s parents were notified that
he had vandalized a school bus and was suspended from school. As
a result, the family’s lawyer send a letter to the Region 10 Board
of Education (“Board”) requesting a PPT, a due process hearing and
an independent evaluation of J.C. in order to determine his special
education needs. The Board granted these requests and concluded
that J.C. suffered from an educational disability and his behavior
at school was a direct result of this disability. J.C. was subsequently
allowed back in school. At the Due Process hearing - the hearing
officer refused to adopt the results as an official order out of
fear that doing so would subject the Board to liability for attorney’s
fees. Nonetheless, J.C. and his parents sued the Board for attorney’s
fees claiming that J.C. was a prevailing party because the PPT had
given him the relief he was soliciting at the due process hearing.
Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA),
the District Court used the catalyst theory of recovery (finding
a causal relationship based on the pressure that the lawsuit caused
in bringing about the result desired) to award attorney’s fees.
However, the catalyst theory of recovery was rejected in Buckhannon
Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), and thus the Court
of Appeals reversed the District’s Court’s decision. Centering its
opinion on the definition of “prevailing party” constructed in Buchannon,
the court states, “to be a prevailing party, one must either secure
a judgment on the merits or be a party to a settlement agreement
that is expressly enforced by the court through a consent decree.”
The plaintiff argued that because the IDEA differs from other statutes
with fee-shifting provisions, it requires a different understanding
of prevailing party. In the alternative, even if Buckhannon
governs the IDEA, the award of attorney’s fees is appropriate because
the decision to create an individualized education program (“IEP”)
was more of a judicial consent decree than a private settlement.
However, the Court rejected these arguments as well as the plaintiff’s
claim that even if he could not prevail under the IDEA, he should
succeed under the broader Rehabilitation Act. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckhannon
governs the claims asserted by J.C. in this appeal and thus they
had no choice but to reverse the decision of the District Court.
(A.H.)
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