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This
is an interesting special education case affirming the principle
that a federal court will uphold the "stay put" provision of the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(j) unless the parties agree otherwise.
Plaintiff
Brian Warton, a twelve year old boy, sought a preliminary injunction
against the defendant school district ("District") to uphold an
interim order of a "Due Process" hearing officer to keep him in
a mainstreamed classroom during the pendency of a federal court
proceeding challenging the hearing officer's final order. Warton
suffered from ADHD and other neurological impairments of unknown
origin that provided the basis for special education services under
IDEA. When Warton entered the sixth grade in September 1998, the
District administered a battery of cognitive and psychological tests
as part of a triennial review. During the ensuing planning and placement
team meetings ("PPT"), the parents and the District disagreed on
Warton's placement; the parents opting for a totally mainstreamed
setting, while the District recommended a multicategorical classroom
setting.
The Wartons
challenged the District's IEP by requesting a Due Process Hearing.
At the inception of the hearing, the hearing officer administered
an interim order permitting Warton to remain in the mainstreamed
classroom during the pendency of the hearing proceedings. In May
2000, the hearing officer issued her decision agreeing with the
District's placement. In June 2000, the Wartons filed a federal
lawsuit challenging the hearing decision, and on August 24, 2000,
they filed a motion for preliminary injunction requiring the District
to implement the stay-put placement as defined in the hearing officer's
interim order.
The
District court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that the hearing
officer's interim decision constituted the stay-put placement during
the pendency of the federal court litigation. The court reasoned
that while IDEA's vague definition of stay-put, namely that "the
child shall remain in the then-current educational placement," sheds
little light on the matter, second circuit precedent indicated that
the "then current placement" means the placement consented to by
the school district and the parents before the parents requested
a due process hearing. See Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694
F.2d 904 (2nd Cir. 1982). The court further rejected
the District's argument, relying on Murphy v. Arlington Cent.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), that
the hearing officer's final order constituted the proper stay-put
placement; in this case a multicategorical classroom setting. The
court distinguished Murphy, where the plaintiffs had unilaterally
removed their child to a private school setting during the pendency
of the review proceedings. The hearing officer in Murphy
agreed with the parents, who then went to court seeking an injunction
to remove the child to the stay put placement identified prior to
their unilateral action. In Murphy, the hearing officer's
final order became the stay put placement. Here, the court found
no analogous unilateral action by the Wartons; thus no agreement
existed making the multicategorical classroom setting the stay put
setting.
The court
went to great lengths to emphasize that a party seeking an order
upholding the stay-put provision under IDEA is in effect invoking
an automatic preliminary injunction. The only scenario where parents
would lose this type of proceeding is where they agreed to a different
stay-put placement prior to the commencement of the Due Process
hearing or if they met the limited factual scenario outlined in
Murphy.
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