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In an
issue of first impression, the Connecticut Appellate Court, in In
re Darien S., thoughtfully affirmed the trial court’s decision to
approve the state Department of Children and Families' ("DCF") "permanency
plan" for a committed juvenile delinquent's future placement. Specifically,
the appellate court ruled that although Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-141(d)
affords the delinquent juvenile a right to a hearing on the permanency
plan, Connecticut law does not require the commissioner to present
specific evidence of a "compelling need" for continued commitment
of the delinquent during that hearing. The permanency hearing should
be about the future plans of the juvenile. The hearing is not --
as the petitioner argued -- an opportunity for review of the juvenile's
previous commitment, or immediate revocation of the commitment to
the DCF commissioner.
The
court initially reviewed the history of the rationale behind the
amendments § 46b-121, as Connecticut is one of only six states that
have adopted permanency planning for delinquent children.
As a result, a thorough review of the federal permanency planning
statute for neglected children, 42. U.S.C. § 657(5)(C), is
undertaken with the understanding that its analogous provisions
would shed some light on the permanency planning procedure for delinquent
children.
The
court noted that the juvenile respondent did not raise issue of
fact on appeal (i.e. violation of court order, interference with
and assault of police officer, assault on commission personnel)
that led to his commitment to DCF custody. There was also no argument
between the parties about the juvenile’s right to have a hearing
on the permanency plan. Instead, the appeal focused on the subject
matter of that hearing. Specifically, the respondent's main argument
was that the DCF commissioner is obligated to provide specific evidence
during this hearing of a compelling need for the juvenile’s continued
commitment.
In its
legal analysis, the court first endeavored to delve into the murky
waters of "established principles of statutory interpretation."
Under the infamous State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537 (2003)
analysis, the overwhelming evidence indicated that the statute on
its face, as well as the legislative intent, pointed to an interpretation
of "future status" for permanency planning, as opposed to an interpretation
that mandates an additional review of previously imposed delinquency
commitment.
The
appellate court further held that the statute does not require a
full evidentiary hearing on the existing commitment at this permanency
hearing. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision
to approve the permanency plan's "goal of revocation of commitment
and placement of the [juvenile' with the mother . . . . ." Although
respondent also argued that the trial court's approval of this permanency
plan violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair
hearing, the appellate court considered and dismissed these constitutional
arguments. Specifically, the court ruled that §46(b)-141(d) allows
the juvenile the due process right to a hearing with respect to
the permanency plan (here, of reunification with his mother) but
this hearing should not be used as a chance to review the juvenile's
existing commitment to DCF.
This
case may be accessed at the Judicial Branch web site by going to
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP82/82ap230.pdf
Elizabeth Cryan, Legal Intern
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