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In this
juvenile justice case, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a juvenile adjudicated as delinquent and committed
to the custody of the Department of Children and Families pursuant
to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-140(j) is entitled to a hearing pursuant
to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-15 to challenge his continued placement
at Connecticut Juvenile Training School ("CJTS"). The Supreme Court,
in reversing the judgment of the trial court, held that the department's
decision to continue placement at CJTS was reviewable in a treatment
plan hearing under § 17a-15.
Immediately
after his delinquency conviction in September 2005, Earl was committed
to the custody of DCF, which prepared a treatment plan pursuant
to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-15 calling for a one-year placement at
CJTS. However, in April 2005 DCF developed a new treatment plan,
requiring that Earl remain at CJTS for a minimum of two years, after
which he would be eligible for placement in a residential treatment
facility. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-15(c), Earl requested
a hearing claiming to be aggrieved by his new treatment plan's recommendation
for an extended commitment to CJTS. The hearing officer dismissed
his request, finding that in seeking to be moved from CJTS to a
residential treatment program, Earl was making a request for parole,
and such requests were governed by Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-140(j)
and 17a-7. The hearing officer determined that requests for parole
are discretionary decisions for the commissioner under § 17a-7 and
could not be challenged in a treatment plan hearing. On appeal,
the trial court adopted the adjudicator's reasoning and dismissed
Earl's request for a hearing.
The Supreme
Court first addressed the threshold jurisdictional issue of whether
DCF's decision during the appeal to place Earl in a residential
treatment program in Pennsylvania rendered the case moot. The court
held that, although moot, the claim qualified for review under the
capable of repetition, yet evading review exception. Turning to
the substantive issues of statutory interpretation at issue in the
case, the Court first worked to discern the meaning of Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 17a-15, and the availability of treatment plan hearings
to challenge placement in juvenile detention. Based on the inclusive
language of § 17a-15(c), which entitled any child aggrieved by any
provision of a treatment plan to a hearing, the Court held that
the statute established broad rights to hearings within the department.
Indeed, the Court could find nothing in the language of the statute
to suggest that the legislature had intended to prohibit a treatment
plan hearing in particular cases. Furthermore, the Court held that
neither § 17a-7 nor § 46b-140, which were invoked by the adjudicator
and the trial court but do not reference treatment plans or treatment
plan hearings, rendered § 17a-15 susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.
The Court
was also not persuaded by the commissioner's argument that under
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 17a-7 and 46b-140(j), Earl's challenge to his
placement at CJTS was a request for parole. Again examining the
statutory language, the Court found that both §§ 17a-7 and 46b-140(j)
treat parole as a placement option distinct from placement at CJTS
or in a residential treatment facility. Earl's request for a hearing
on his treatment plan was thus not a request for parole, as suggested
by the adjudicator, since parole is an independent placement option
distinct from a request for placement in a private treatment facility.
Finally,
the Court dismissed the commissioner's argument that the Appellate
Court in In re Darien S., 82 Conn. App. 169, had already considered
and rejected the claim that there exists a statutory right to challenge
one's placement at CJTS in a treatment plan hearing. In that case,
a juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent claimed that DCF was required
to make an evidentiary showing to sustain his delinquency commitment
at a permanency plan hearing pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-141.
The Court responded that the reasoning of In re Darien S. did not
apply here, since the present case involved a request for a hearing
to address DCF's choice of placement under § 17a-15, and not a challenge
to the essence of the juvenile commitment itself under § 46b-141.
-Justin
Taylor, law student intern.
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