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In this
juvenile justice case, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a trial court may extend a delinquency commitment
when the "child" at issue has reached the age of 16, given that
the definition of "child" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-120 is defined
as a 'person under sixteen' or a person over 16 who has a violated
a court order issued subsequent to a delinquency finding. In
this case neither definition applied to William D. The Supreme Court
held that for purposes of extending a person's commitment pursuant
to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-141, it only matters what age the person
was at the time of the original commitment.
In this
case, William was born on May 14, 1988. On November 13, 2003, after
he had been adjudicated delinquent, the court ordered that he be
committed to DCF for a period not to exceed 18 months, a time period
which would expire on May 13, 2005. William was sent to CJTS, and
after a period of time, was released back into the community where
he continued to struggle with school conduct and substance abuse.
On April 7, 2005, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-141, DCF moved
to extend William's commitment for twelve months. William opposed
the motion, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to extend
his commitment because he was not a 'child' within the definition
of C.G.S. 46b-120, as he was over 16 and had not violated a court
order. The trial court rejected William's argument and extended
the boy's commitment to May 14, 2006, at which time he would turn
18 years old.
The Supreme
Court agreed that the trial court retained jurisdiction to extend
William's commitment. The Court determined that the term 'child',
while perhaps subject to a strict interpretation, must be construed
within the context of the broader statutory scheme and legislative
intent underlying the various provisions.
The Court
reasoned that § 46b-141 incorporates by reference the person's status
as a child at the original commitment proceeding. Additionally,
the statute authorizes the court to grant a motion to extend commitment
when it is in the best interests of the community. Furthermore,
the statute requires the trial court hold a permanency hearing not
later than 'twelve months after a child is committed,' and that
subsequent hearings must be held 'not less frequently than every
12 months.' Under William's proposed interpretation of the statute,
the court would lack jurisdiction to conduct a permanency hearing
upon the child attaining age 16. Therefore, if a 15 year old was
adjudicated delinquent and committed to DCF for 18 months, the court
would either have to conduct a permanency hearing in a short time
or lose jurisdiction to conduct the hearing on the child's 16th
birthday. (Indeed such hearing could even modify or revoke DCF's
commitment.) The Court determined that neither outcome is consistent
with the purpose underlying the statutory scheme, namely to protect
both the child and the community. In fact, such an application could
operate to the child's detriment, as the court would be deprived
of jurisdiction to adjudicate the permanency plan throughout the
remainder of the individual's commitment, thus placing the person
into a 'legal limbo.'
The Court
further dismissed William's argument that the rule of lenity mandates
that the statute be construed strictly, and against the state. The
Court held that the rule of lenity applies only when a statute remains
ambiguous after all tools of statutory construction have been applied.
Finally,
the Court determined that William's due process rights were not
violated because he was expressly informed during his initial commitment
proceeding that his term of commitment could be extended.
Sarah
Eagan 12/07.
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