Case: In re Devon B.
264 Conn. 572 (2003)
Abuse and Neglect, Mental Health :
Connecticut Supreme Court
July 1, 2003
In
re Devon B., the Connecticut Supreme Court held that where a cognitively
limited parent is a client of the Department of Mental Retardation
(DMR), this agency is a necessary party in a child protection proceeding
involving the client’s child.
The
State Department of Children and Families (DCF) committed Devon
to its custody adjudicating her as "uncared for due to homeless[ness].
Devon’s mother, Tammy, a young woman with a long history of DMR
involvement moved the trial court to add DMR as a "necessary party."
She argued that the DCF’s obligation to "help the parent, if possible,
regain custody of her child" demanded DMR involvement in the formulation
and follow through of DCF’s specific steps. Specifically, she claimed
that as a DMR client, DMR owed her the statutory obligation to provide
services, including housing assistance. The trial court denied this
request and proceeded to commit Devon to DCF’s custody.
On
appeal, DCF argued that DMR involvement was neither necessary nor
appropriate because the statutes governing the formulation of specific
steps do not mention parties aside from DCF and the child’s parents.
In addition to this, DCF argued that although DMR is statutorily
obligated to assist mentally retarded persons, DMR does not have
the duty to assist in child protection proceedings or ensure care
for the children of the mentally retarded.
The
Supreme Court rejected DCF’s arguments, finding that the exclusion
of DMR was in direct conflict with DCF’s duty to aid a parent in
cases where reunification is possible. The court reasoned that because
DCF is not able to attend to the specific needs of mentally retarded
parents, it must involve the agency that possesses that mandate.
In response to DCF’s interpretation of "necessary party," the court
stated that a more inclusive definition is consistent with case
law. In particular, the court cited the case of Biro v. Hill, 214
Conn. 1,6 (1990), which held that "a party is deemed necessary if
its presence is absolutely required to assure a fair and equitable
trial." Given Tammy’s reliance on DMR for basic living assistance,
DMR’s absence as a party would be improper. While the court noted
that ordering DMR to continue to work with Tammy did not necessarily
ensure that custody would be reclaimed, it would give the trial
court the authority to compel DCF and DMR to work together to work
together to provide necessary services.
In
a strongly worded dissent, Chief Justice Sullivan opined that the
trial did not err in its decision to exclude DMR because Tammy had
not exhausted the administrative remedies available to her through
the DMR appeals process. In addition, he reasoned that without a
legally imposed duty, DMR did not did not have a stake in the outcome
and therefore, should not be joined as a party. He noted that the
majority had taken significant liberties in its interpretation of
what constitutes a "necessary party," indicating that the Practice
Book §9-18, concerning the addition of parties, does not use the
phrase "necessary party." The resultant confusion from adding numerous
ancillary parties to a child protection case would bear disastrous
results – significantly complicating and undermining the process
that is designed to protect involved parties. It is not clear from
this decision whether or not this holding would extend to include
the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services.
