In an important decision
limiting the Department of Children and Families’ (“Department”)
inherent power to unilaterally transfer a mentally disabled juvenile
delinquent from a Department facility to a correctional institution,
the appellate court held that the trial court, at the very least,
was obligated to make a finding that the transfer was in the trial
court’s best interest in order to protect the juvenile’s right of
due process. The youth is a mentally disabled man with the intellect
of a four or five year old who reached the age of majority (18)
after he filed the appeal. The Department moved to transfer him
from Long Lane School (a Department facility) to the Manson Youth
Institution (a correctional facility) claiming he was dangerous
to himself and others. The court ordered the transfer, despite not
determining the child’s competency. The court tackled two main issues.
First, the Department’s mootness
claim (because the child reached his eighteenth birthday after he
filed the appeal) failed because the case met all three criteria
to the “capable of repetition yet evading review” mootness doctrine.
Second, the court agreed with the young man’s claim that he had
been denied due process of law because the court failed to determine
his competency prior to ordering his transfer to a correctional
institution. Because the child had been diagnosed with dysthymia,
conduct disorder, mild mental retardation and a borderline personality
disorder, there was significant concern regarding his competency
with respect to pending adult criminal proceedings. The court noted
that the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the child’s
interests was not in itself enough of a safeguard his constitutionally
protected liberty interest. Since the state’s inherent duty is to
protect the “best interest of the child,” the court had a duty to
evaluate competency prior to such a transfer.
In a strongly worded concurrence,
Chief Judge Lavery noted that the Department had “breached its duty”
owed to the juvenile because it failed to offer him “adequate treatment
programs corresponding to [his] individual [need]. He wrote the
concurrence “so that no mentally handicapped child will ever have
to suffer the debilitating treatment suffered by the respondent.”
