Case:
Schaffer V. Weast
___ U.S. ___, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 8554, 2005 WL 3028015 (2005).
Special Education
US Supreme Court
Decided: November 14, 2005
In a decision that may have
far reaching implications for disabled students eligible for special
education services, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
burden of proof in an administrative "due process" hearing challenging
the student's education plan is placed on the party seeking relief,
whether that party is the disabled child or the local school district.
In Schaffer v. Weast, the Court entered the murky waters
of special education law, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA") and opted to tip the balance against state's
rights in its attempt to define the scope and of administrative
proceedings. As a result, in states that have not determined which
party maintains the burden of proof in special education due process
hearings, parties seeking relief in those proceedings will now be
required to carry the burden of proof, placing the already cumbersome
task of challenging a local board of education on a much higher
footing.
Brian Schaffer, the disabled
plaintiff, suffers from learning disabilities and speech-language
impairment. From grades kindergarten through seven, he attended
a private school where he struggled academically. After his seventh
grade year, his mother proceeded to contact the local educational
authority ("LEA") 1 seeking a public school placement
for him the following year. The LEA evaluated Brian and convened
an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") meeting offering him a
placement in one of the county's two middle schools 2.
The parents demurred from this offer, placed Brian in a private
school catering to his academic needs, and initiated a due process
hearing seeking compensation for the private school tuition. The
due process administrative law judge ("ALJ") held that the parents
had the burden of proof and ruled in favor of the LEA. The parents
brought a civil action pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2) challenging
the administrative decision, where the District Court reversed and
remanded the case after concluding the LEA had the burden of proof
in administrative proceedings under IDEA. The LEA appealed to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated and remanded the
case to the District Court after learning that the ALJ reconsidered
the case, deeming the evidence truly "in equipoise," and ruled in
favor of the parents. Eventually, the case wended its way back to
the Fourth Circuit, which in a split decision, concluded that there
was no persuasive reason to depart from the normal rule of allocating
the burden of proof to the party seeking relief 3, thereby
ruling in favor of the LEA.
In a short decision authored
by Justice O'Connor, the Court opted to follow the traditional legal
pathway in a statutory cause of action, whereby the party seeking
relief has the burden of proof in an administrative proceeding 4.
Absent explicit statutory language, which does not exist in IDEA,
the Court seemed unwilling to change the long held belief that placing
the entire burden of proof on an opposing party (here the LEA),
would be imprudent and defy statutory precedent. In addition, the
more comprehensive analysis of IDEA provides ample justification
to refute the parents' contention that the LEA should always possess
the burden of proof in due process hearings. Assigning this burden
to the LEA's will not necessarily ensure that disabled students
receive a free appropriate public education pursuant to IDEA, but
the resulting shifting of marginal resources would put an undue
burden on already financially strapped LEA's.
The Court also rejected what
it considered the parents' strongest argument - that the general
rule of ordinary fairness requires that the litigant not have the
burden of establishing facts particularly within the knowledge of
his adversary. Under IDEA, parents are provided with a number of
procedural safeguards, including the right to unfettered access
to school records, an independent educational evaluation pf their
child, and attorney's fees if they prevail at a hearing. Thus, the
Court opines that these protections ensure that the school bears
no unique informational advantage.
In an important caveat to
the holding, however, Justice O'Connor notes that while several
states (including Connecticut 5), have laws or regulations
placing the burden of proof on the LEA, those state requirements
will not be affected because no such law or regulation exists in
Maryland. Since the argument of whether states should be the sole
decision maker regarding the allocation of the burden (as proposed
by Justice Breyer in his dissent) was not raised at the argument,
the court declined to address it.
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
argues that the complexity and overwhelming nature of IDEA mandates
placing the burden on the LEA to even the playing field for parents
of children with special needs. Justice Breyer, taking a shot at
the court's unwillingness to adhere to principles of federalism,
indicated that states should always bear the burden of establishing
sufficient administrative laws and regulations determining how the
federal statute should be applied in its jurisdiction, and therefore
the case should be remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings.
1. Montgomery County Public
Schools System, Montgomery Maryland.
2. An IEP meeting is the
generic description for a team meeting to develop a child's IEP
under IDEA. Connecticut refers to its IEP meetings as planning and
placement team meetings, or PPT's.
3. When he reached high school
age, the LEA agreed to place Brian in a high school with a special
learning center. The litigation continued, however, as the parents
sought compensation for the private middle school tuition.
4. The Court substitutes
the terms "burden of proof" with "burden of persuasion" interchangeably
in the decision. Although traditionally the term "burden of persuasion,"
wherein a party loses if the evidence is closely balanced, is utilized
to describe the adjudicatory process, the opinion relies on "burden
of proof" as its general term of art, and therefore "burden of proof"
is used here.
